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Traditional Communities as "Subjects of Rights" and the
Commoditization of Knowledge in Brazil
Abstract
The International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 169 and the Convention of Biological Diversity
(CBD) led signatory state-members to recognize traditional communities as subjects of rights, and no longer
as objects of tutelage. However, their implementation may bring new challenges in states adopting market-
based decision-making to rule social life. In pluri-ethnic societies in which power differentials are structurally
embedded, traditional communities and companies exploring their resources and knowledge have been,
historically, unequal and opposed parties. In processes of benefit sharing, these unequal social actors are
wrongfully considered equally free subjects of rights in negotiating contracts in supposedly free markets.
Erasing historical and structural differences, and assuming equality in an unequal world will only reproduce
the inequality that CBD has aimed to address.
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Traditional  Communities  as  "Subjects  of  Rights"  and  
the Commoditization of  Knowledge in Brazi l  
In this article, we reflect on the current legal and ethical issues that have emerged in Brazil with respect 
to the relationship between traditional communities and researchers and entrepreneurs interested in 
their knowledge. Empirical case studies in the Amazon have shown that knowledge per se is not an 
object of ownership in the sense of individual proprietorship by members of traditional communities. In 
this context, knowledge is not an object of market transaction through contracts that can be established 
through private relations. Instead, in traditional communities, the verb “to own” can be understood as: 
“to recognize one’s state of having full claim, authority, power, and dominion over a tangible or 
intangible object” (Webster’s Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language, 1994,  
p. 1032), and related to traditional knowledge this state implies a collective subject and culturally 
established rules that do not necessarily follow market criteria. In our field observations in the Amazon, 
we learned that owning traditional knowledge is a collective right of those who belong to a community, 
assuming a common social identity based on a shared and indivisible corpus of traditions.    
Throughout Latin America the distinct notion of knowledge and respective rights have resulted in socio-
environmental struggles against the mainstream tendency to scaling up exploration of extractive 
resources as commodities (Svampa, 2012). According to empirical evidence that we have gathered in 
the Brazilian Amazon since 2006, communities and companies may work with the same resource (e.g., a 
species), while having rather different purposes (i.e., while entrepreneurs aim at profit, traditional 
communities aim at social reproduction). In pursuing each stakeholder’s goals, benefits may be shared, 
but often in disproportionate ways. Moreover, entrepreneurs’ approaches to exploring natural resources 
are qualitatively different from those of traditional communities, especially resources under common 
use.1 These differences were historically disregarded in the juridical domains.   
As recently as the late twentieth century, the question of the Indigenous and tribal peoples was typically 
treated as a matter of tutelage or of protecting minorities in international and national forums. Today, at 
least formally, it is possible to identify a trend towards a greater recognition of traditional communities 
as subjects of rights and not objects of tutelage. Article 8j of the Convention on Biological Diversity 
(CBD, 2012) is a remarkable example as this provision recognizes rights to traditional knowledge on 
biodiversity and biological resources. However, our research has shown that article 8j will be effective 
only if signatory State-members ratify and implement it in conjunction with all other rights to traditional 
ways of life, especially regarding their territories, in coordination with International Labor 
Organization’s Convention 1692 (ILO, 2012). 
However, by September 2012, 168 State-members had ratified the CBD (CBD, 2012), while only 22 
had ratified ILO Convention 169 (ILO, 2012). As these Conventions must be harmonized with national 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 For this fundamental concept to understand traditional knowledge in diverse situations, see Ostrom (1990) and 
2 ILO (2012) Convention 169 Article 14.1 stated:  
The rights of ownership and possession of the peoples concerned over the lands which they traditionally 
occupy shall be recognised. In addition, measures shall be taken in appropriate cases to safeguard the 
right of the peoples concerned to use lands not exclusively occupied by them, but to which they have 
traditionally had access for their subsistence and traditional activities. Particular attention shall be paid to 
the situation of nomadic peoples and shifting cultivators in this respect. 
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laws, worldwide controversial issues such as rights to land and protection from encroachment caused by 
infra-structural investments of large companies continue to be dealt mostly within the realm of social 
and political struggles. In Brazil, for example, in June 2014, Congress representatives of agribusiness and 
industrial sectors tried to cancel Brazilian commitment to ILO 169 Convention (Câmara dos Deputados, 
2014a). In August 2014, entrepreneurs interested in traditional knowledge associated with biodiversity 
resources proposed a law related to the CBD disregarding the traditional people’s rights to prior, free, 
and informed consent (Câmara dos Deputados, 2014b). 
Although both ILO Convention 169, ratified in 1989 (ILO, 2012), and the CBD (2012), implemented 
in 1992, signatory State-members at least formally recognize traditional communities as the subjects of 
rights, opening opportunities for public actions and social transformations, the implementation of the 
CBD may face new challenges in nations like Brazil that have adopted market-based decision-making 
mechanisms to rule their society’s economic life. Promised structural changes towards social welfare 
policies were aborted in these states. Social well-being became a matter of public assistance or mere 
liberality by the private sector, maintaining structural social and economic differentials. In pluri-ethnic 
and multi-cultural societies with structurally embedded power imbalances, traditional communities on 
one side and companies exploring their genetic resources and knowledge on the other have been 
historically unequal and opposed parties in the relations of production and circulation (Almeida, 2011; 
Daniel, 2004). Regarding the interaction between these parties and among different cultures, Haverkort 
and Reijntjes (2010) stated: “There is much variety in the way different positions of power and 
differences in the effectiveness of available technologies are being used and differences, too, in the way 
people react to domination” (p.21). 
In fact, diverse processes of benefit sharing are being implemented under the current national rules of 
CBD’s signatory countries. In Brazil, article 8j of CDB was regulated through the controversial 
Provisional Act 2186-16/2002 (Brazil, 2001)3 and, in spite these differences, a commonality is that 
unequal social actors such as traditional communities and entrepreneurs are brought together to sign 
contracts. According to Roppo (1988), by definition, contracts can be signed only under the assumption 
that parties are equal and are considered free subjects of rights negotiating in a presumed free market of 
goods and services. This assumption erases historical and structural differences while the recognized 
subjects of rights do not have their decisions equally recognized. In fact, the term “rights” means only the 
right to sell knowledge in the market. Assuming equality in an unequal world will only reproduce the 
inequality that article 8j of the CBD is expected to address. Researchers and entrepreneurs who ignore 
these differences assume a fictional co-operation, in which unequal parties co-operate through relations 
in which the powerful reduce the benefits for the powerless. In addition, a disproportionate focus on 
financial issues of access and benefit sharing, without consideration of the traditional ways of living, 
tends to favor companies rather than communities. Benefit sharing contracts may become mere 
instruments to endorse the alleged “social and environmental responsibility” to support companies’ 
profitable purposes, while strengthening processes of “commoditization” of knowledge (Shiraishi, 2008).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The history of the Provisional Act 2186-16/2001 reveals the strong interests of multinational and national, 
pharmaceutical and cosmetic companies (Santilli, 2005, p. 186). 
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In the following sections, we discuss our findings in case studies involving social movements4 
represented by grassroots organizations that were engaged in benefit sharing processes in the Amazon. 
They have challenged current forms of CBD implementation by defining what is not negotiable, and by 
demanding effective conditions for enforcing previous informed consent and the manifestation of true 
choices.      
Our research is based on a methodology that combines empirical data collection through long-term,  
in-depth ethnographic fieldwork among the quebradeiras de coco babaçu and conceptual discussions 
between academic researchers and social movement leaders, aiming at producing knowledge for public 
action. The ethnographic data and anthropological and juridical analysis are both academic research 
products within public universities and integral parts of concrete processes carried out by grassroots 
organizations representing traditional communities in the Eastern Amazon. 
The reference case study comprises on the babaçu (babassu) breaker women, who live in Eastern 
Amazon’s babaçu (Attalea speciosa5 Mart. ex. Spreng) palm forests. We contrast this social situation 
with two other cases to draw evidences from their specific perspective, by eliciting similarities and 
differences. The two other cases refer to the Ashaninka Indigenous group, who live in ombrophylous 
rainforests of the Western Amazon containing murumuru palms (Astrocaryum ulei6) in the State of Acre 
and the Association of Small Agroforestry Producers of the Projeto de Reflorestamento Econõmico 
Consorciado e Adensado (RECA Project), who are family farmers practicing agroforestry with native 
species, including cupuaçu (Theobroma grandflorum7), in the State of Rondônia. All three cases 
featured interactions with Natura S. A., currently the company with one of the largest market share in 
the Brazilian cosmetics, fragrances, and toiletry sector, reaching 60% of the Brazilian households through 
1.3 million sales consultants (Natura, 2015), and one of the few companies attempting to comply with 
the implementation of the CBD in Brazil.  
Case Studies:  Peasants,  Traditional  Communities,  Indigenous and Family Farmers 
Case Study 1:  The Peasant Traditional  Communities  of  Babassu Breaker Women   
In peasant traditional communities of babassu palm forests in Eastern Amazonia, men are in charge of 
organizing agricultural activities, and the entire family participates in cultivating mainly rice, beans, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 For this article, we draw upon Scherer-Warren (2002) to define social movements as an analytical category that 
comprises a coherent set of symbolic references in a domain of values and social practices, which are based on 
collective actions and memory. While social movements are more fluid and less hierarchical, social or grassroots 
organizations are hierarchical and normalized structures created to represent the groups to other sectors of society. 
In our study, the Indigenous Ashaninka has created their own grassroots organization, Association Apiwtxa, to 
represent their interests formally. 
5Attalea speciosa, previously known as Orbignya phalerata, forms homogeneous and equilibrated secondary 
forests, with estimated area of 20 million hectares in Northern, Northeastern, and Central Brazil (MIC/STI, 
1982), where approximately 400,000 families live on agricultural and extractive activities.  
6Astrocaryum ulei, regionally known as murumuru or murmuru, is a component of primary rainforests, either in 
highlands or seasonally flooded lands. Its kernels produce fat rich in lauric acids. These are used for margarines 
and cosmetics 
7Theobroma grandiflorum Willd. ex. Spreng.  Schum. is a native species of highland rainforests, which has been 
also cultivated for the production of fruit pulps and seeds, either for direct consumption or industrialization. 
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maize, and cassava, through slash-and-burn shifting cultivation. Women are in charge of organizing 
extractive activities, in which mostly women and children gather and break open the fruits of babassu 
palms to extract kernels, which are processed into edible oil or soap. The fruits also have a starchy 
mesocarp from which women make edible flour, and an extremely dense endocarp, which provides high 
quality charcoal. These products are used for domestic consumption, but they are also sold in large 
volumes to industries. The sale of kernels is a primary source of cash income for these communities.8 
Kernels extracted by women are usually sold through middlemen to industries processing them into oils 
for the production of soap, margarine, edible oils, and cosmetics (Amaral, 1983; Porro, 2002). 
These women identify themselves and are recognized nationally as quebradeiras de coco babaçu or 
babassu breaker women. Their collective identity is neither defined by a common biological ancestry nor 
by a shared ethnicity stricto sensus. Rather, their social identity emerged from common struggles against 
ongoing injustices that are originated in the colonial processes of enslavement, detribalization, and 
forced migration. The first time they presented their collective identity as Quebradeiras de Coco Babaçu 
to the large society was in 1991, when 240 representatives of more than a hundred villages from four 
states met to vindicate their rights. They denounced attempts of illegal eviction by cattle ranchers and 
other entrepreneurs supported by governments from traditionally occupied lands and the destruction of 
forests. Throughout these processes, their relationship with babassu forests became essential for their 
cultural and physical reproduction.  
Violent agrarian conflicts affected these traditional communities from the mid-1960s to the late 1980s 
(and up until today in some areas). Many of these struggles erupted when pretense landlords began to 
slash babassu palms to plant pastures or prohibit women to enter the palm forests, which are 
traditionally a common use resource. During these struggles the babassu palm was socially and 
politically conceived as the “mother of the people,” due to its symbolic and material significance in 
supporting resistance against antagonistic sectors and an unfavorable State. Traditional knowledge, 
which has helped sustain the current systems of production and conception of rights, is thus strongly 
rooted on ideals of autonomy and freedom.9 It controlled family labor and protected traditional territory.  
Traditional knowledge regarding babassu palm as a common resource is the basis of a fundamental 
governance mechanism for the maintenance of the palm forests, through a traditional system of agro-
extractive production. While knowledge enhanced specific uses of babassu products and management of 
this secondary forest, historical memory of survival as a free peasantry has laid the actual foundation for 
the people to articulate their diverse knowledge within this ecosystem. Moreover, their traditional 
knowledge has been critical in highlighting cattle ranchers’ unsustainable resource use (Porro, 2002).  
In the early 1990s, babassu breaker women founded grassroots organizations to mobilize and represent 
themselves in the public domain. Agro-extractive cooperatives were also formed to assure better 
conditions for their participation in the market. Currently, babassu breaker women’s production sustains 
the livelihoods of about 400,000 extractivists (Almeida, 2011). However, despite their undeniable social, 
economic, and environmental achievements, these traditional communities had been excluded from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 According to official data, in 2013 the total production of babaçu kernels in Brazil was 89.739 tons that had a 
value greater than R$122 millions (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística [IBGE], 2014). 
9  Authors such as Chayanov (1986) and Shanin (1971) have studied the peasantry’s autonomy and sense of 
freedom from landlords and employers.  
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major agrarian and economic policies, which historically favored logging, cattle ranching, and, lately, 
agribusiness and large infrastructural projects. 
Since the mid-1990s, Inter-State Movement of the Babassu Breaker Women (MIQCB), Association in 
Settlement Areas in the State of Maranhão (ASSEMA), and the cooperatives have processed and 
commercialized babassu products as part of fair trade initiatives. Babassu, which through private 
companies has been in the international market since the early twentieth century, found a niche market 
for “green,” “ecological,” and “natural” products through the efforts of the babassu breaker women, with 
sales to European and American companies.10 Although proactive in promoting their products and 
defending the babassu palm,11 only in 2005 did the grassroots organizations of the babassu breaker 
women became aware of Provisional Act 2186-16, which in 2001 regularized the implementation of 
Article 8j of CBD in Brazil.12  
In the case of babassu, the first genetic resource and associated traditional knowledge accessed by a 
company under the Provisional Act was its starchy mesocarp, processed as flour. Oil from its kernels and 
charcoal from the fruits’ endocarp have long been used for industrial purposes. The sale and use of 
mesocarp flour had until recently limited distribution to local markets and domestic consumption as 
food, livestock feed, and bait for wild shrimps. In the early 1990s, ASSEMA had created cooperatives to 
organize the production and commercialization of babaçu products. One of these cooperatives, 
Cooperative of Agro-Extractive Producers of the Municipality of Esperantinópolis (COOPAESP), 
began to invest in alternative technological improvements for processing mesocarp flour in 2002.  
In 2004, Natura Cosméticos S. A. (henceforth Natura), the largest Brazilian cosmetic company, 
purchased 100 kg of mesocarp flour from COOPAESP to bioprospect. Although they were familiar with 
Provisional Act 2186-16, Natura purchased the flour sample through a regular commercial transaction. 
In 2005, Natura’s professionals visited ASSEMA and COOPAESP and, according to the interviewed 
quebradeiras de coco, they accessed traditional knowledge associated with this flour. They then 
proposed to discuss the terms of consent and benefit sharing. Prior to answering the company, 
COOPAESP asked guidance from its institutional partners and the Council for Management of Genetic 
Resources (CGEN) of the Brazilian Ministry of Environment. Supported by ASSEMA, in 2006, 
COOPAESP began to discuss with Natura the regularization of access and benefit sharing, especially 
because the legally required prior informed consent had been already disobeyed. By the end of 2007, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 The Bodyshop, Aveda, Slow Food, among others.  
11 The Movement of the Babassu Breaker Women managed to approve their “Free Babassu Law”— a set of rules 
prohibiting the destruction of babassu palm forests and ensuring their free access by peasant women. The Law 
was incorporated into the municipal laws in 17 municipalities (see also Shiraishi, 2006)  
12 Provisional Act No. 2186-16, dated August 23, 2001, regulates item II from Paragraphs 1 and 4 of Article 225 of 
the Constitution. It also regulates Articles 1, 8 (item j), 10 (item c), 15 and 16 (items 3 and 4) of the Convention 
on Biological Diversity. Provisional Act 2186-16 provides for the access to genetic heritage, protection, and access 
to associated traditional knowledge, benefit-sharing, and access to and transfer of technology for its conservation 
and use, and makes other provisions. 
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after a year of debates and intense negotiations, in which the Federal Public Ministry (MPF)13 
participated, COOPAESP signed the terms of consent and a contract for benefit sharing. They received 
a percentage of the benefits earned from the products’ sales and a lump sum payment, which for the 
enterprise was a donation and for the MPF and COOPAESP was a symbolic compensation for the 
violation of previous consent. The contract was signed under the COOPAESP’s and ASSEMA’s 
understanding that the Brazilian government would impose the penalties for the violation of prior 
informed consent. Also, they realized that, since power differentials were so great between company and 
communities, the government would assist the parties in determining the terms and values of the benefit 
sharing contract. 
According to its social statute (Natura, 2012), Natura is a publicly held corporation and has as objectives 
the exploration of trade, export, and import of beauty, hygiene, toiletry products, and cosmetic products, 
among others. Currently, Natura’s main commercialized products are cosmetics, fragrances, and toiletry 
items, which are sold through 1.2 million direct sales consultants to 100 million consumers. In Brazil, 
Natura’s market share in this personal care production sector is greater than those of Unilever, Avon, 
and L’Oreal (Euromonitor, 2012). The company strongly advertises its use of Brazilian biodiversity 
resources and that, by purchasing their extractive products, consumers are supporting communities with 
whom the company shares benefits.  
Political leaders and intellectuals representing diverse interests have praised the company’s exemplary 
initiatives, including grassroots rubber tapper leader, former senator and minister, and unsuccessful 
candidate for 2014 presidential election Marina Silva (Sassine, 2010; Zanini, 2009). Prominent scholars, 
such as anthropologist Mary Allegretti (Allegretti, 2008, 2011), have also collaborated with Natura. 
Christopher Meyer, an entrepreneur and graduate of economics from Harvard University, also found in 
Natura a role model for the current capitalist world (Meyer, 2012). Statements about ethics and 
environmental sustainability are repeatedly reinforced in Natura’s institutional discourses and in the 
rationale of its entrepreneurial operations (Natura, 2012).     
In Brazil, Natura has been a leader in attempting to comply with the Provisional Act 2186-16. Most of 
the requests CGEN received to regularize access and benefit sharing came from Natura. However, 
Natura has continuously engaged in bioprospecting without meeting all legal requirements, claiming 
there were too many complex regulations with which to comply. In 2010, Natura was charged with a 
total fine of approximately R$21 million by the Brazilian Institute for the Environment and Renewable 
Natural Resources (IBAMA) because of its inappropriate use of traditional knowledge associated with 
the genetic patrimony.  Natura’s Director of Corporative Affairs and Governmental Relations responded, 
“The problem has occurred because of the confusion of the current law. But it is a discouragement for 
the businesses and for the science in the country” (Mendes & Balazina, 2010, para. 10). According to 
him, the company complied with the CBD’s principles. As of 2014, Natura’s lawyers are contesting some 
of the charges. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 In Brazil, the Federal Public Ministry is responsible to ensure the juridical order, the democratic regime, and 
individual and social unalienable rights, even against governments. It also supervises the implementation of the 
laws, the protection of the public patrimony, and how public powers assure the rights established in the 
Constitution. The Public Ministry has autonomy in the structure of the State: it cannot be extinct and its 
attributions are not transferable.  
6
The International Indigenous Policy Journal, Vol. 6, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 8
http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol6/iss2/8
	   	  
The grassroots organizations of babassu breaker women are very aware of power imbalances between 
them and Natura, in terms of access to information and their relative influence in the economic field. 
Throughout their experience of negotiating for access and benefit sharing with Natura under Provisional 
Act 2186-16, the women have learned that their only chance to deal with such power imbalance is 
through forming a collective understanding on the rights to traditional knowledge. This understanding 
has been developed through the implementation of small projects, controlled by the women themselves, 
and through internal debates reuniting leaders (from grassroots organizations linked to MIQCB in four 
states). Since 2008, the women have organized several workshops and seminars for their communities, 
including with youth. Since 2010, they have invited other grassroots organizations that had negotiations 
with Natura to discuss how they would improve the legal framework so that it would help enhance their 
own way of life. Over three years, these small projects and meetings were financed with the money 
received as a result of negotiations with Natura. This was a strategy to socialize the benefits and 
normalize the discussion about rights related to traditional knowledge. This understanding was 
preceded by cultural conceptions that the benefits from traditional knowledge were to be shared freely 
among all traditional people. There should be no legitimation of the association between the enrichment 
of those who benefited from traditional communities' knowledge in the market and the impoverishment 
of these communities. After a process of politicizing the debates, the notion that traditional communities 
have the rights and the mission to use these benefits for the advancement of their way of life prevailed. 
The result was free sharing among the traditional communities and collective action against usurpation 
of rights. In this process, the babassu breaker women have also learned from the experiences of other 
communities.  
Case Study 2:  Indigenous Ashaninka  
The Ashaninka Indigenous people of the Apiwtxa group live in the easternmost Brazilian Amazon. 
Having migrated from the Peruvian Andean piedmont in the early 20th century, they established their 
territory by the Amônea River, which nourishes rich and dense primary ombrophylous forests in the 
State of Acre.  
In the late 1980s, after decades of struggles against loggers and rubber entrepreneurs, the Ashaninka 
began to search for new livelihood opportunities (Pimenta, 2007). Supported by non-governmental 
organizations, such as Indigenous Rights Nuclei and Pro-Indigenous Commission, they began to raise 
funds for their projects (Albert, 2000). The Ashaninka hired a researcher to carry out bioprospecting on 
their forest resources. Having organized field expeditions in the presence of Ashaninka adults, this 
researcher collected samples with the help of Ashaninka youths. He also obtained information from 
elders about resource management and use. In 1996, after three years of shared research activities, this 
researcher set up his own cosmetic company, Tawaya, which was named after a river in the Ashaninka 
territory. According to our interviewees, he then proposed to buy the fruits of the murumuru palm from 
the Ashaninka or whomever else wanted to sell them. The Ashaninka contested his proposals, affirming 
that they were the owners of the research project and resulting knowledge. The Ashaninka could not 
accept the mere role of providers of raw materials and felt betrayed because the hired researcher used the 
collectively gathered information for his private benefit.   
In 2007, the Federal Public Ministry endorsed the Ashaninka’s claim of rights to traditional knowledge. 
The Public Ministry then proceeded with a civil public lawsuit, which resulted in tribunal hearings 
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against the researcher and his company, Tawaya, along with two other companies, Natura Cosmetics 
 S. A., and Chemyunion Química Ltd., which allegedly also accessed Ashaninka’s traditional knowledge 
associated with the genetic patrimony of murumuru. The National Institute of Intellectual Property, 
which had granted a patent to the researcher, was also sued.  
In 2009, in the midst of the trial, Ashaninka leader Moisés Ashaninka made the following statement:  
Natura came to know the murumuru after a research [sic] that was carried out by us. This 
company saw its potential and entered in the market departing from our community project. 
The companies do not want to recognize our rights, because they are afraid to open a precedent 
for other cases. But we are going to continue to fight for our rights. (Machado, 2009, para. 10)  
After referring to a detailed anthropological report on the relationship between the Ashaninka and the 
researcher, the Federal Public Ministry charged the researcher, Natura, Chemyunion, and Tawaya with 
inappropriately exploiting traditional knowledge. It asked the court to order the researcher to return all 
materials and information he obtained in his investigation to the Ashaninka and to disclose the names of 
all persons, companies, and laboratories to whom he gave access to the materials and information. The 
Ministry also asked the National Institute of Intellectual Property to cancel all applications for patents 
and registers related to the Ashaninkas’ knowledge. According to its demand to comply with benefit 
sharing, the company had to pay 50% of its net profit from products with murumuru since the beginning 
of commercial operations and up to five years following the matter’s settlement in court to the 
Ashaninka. In addition, as compensation for moral harm to the community and to Brazilian society at 
large, the Ministry asked to the Federal Justice Court to set an amount to be equally shared by the 
Apiwtxa Association and the Federal Fund for the Defense of Diffuse Rights.14 In the meantime, the 
Federal Public Ministry requested that the Federal Justice Court force the National Institute for 
Industrial Property to disclose the origin of traditional knowledge in every patent or registration for a 
brand, invention, design, or model that was associated with traditional knowledge on murumuru.  
Natura’s Director of Corporative Issues complained about the confusing concept behind the intellectual 
property rights regime. He argued, if what the Federal Public Ministry ruled was correct, the legal 
framework meant to discourage innovation as well as applied and pure research activities (Mendes & 
Balazina, 2010). Other companies agreed with this argument. The Scientific Technical Manager of Aché 
Laboratories contended that the current intellectual property law is:  
Of such a complexity that discourages the exploration of such resources, because it is so difficult 
to obtain an authorization to access and research genetic resources . . . The studies for the 
development of pharmaceuticals are of long duration, incur high costs and only a small fraction 
arrives to the market. Therefore, the eventual payment should incur only in the effectively 
developed and commercialized product. (Balanzina, 2010, para. 4)  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 The Fund for the Defense of the Diffuse Rights was created by the Law of the Civil Public Action  
(Law nº 7.347/ 1985) and regularized by Decree nº 1.306/ 1994. The Law of the Civil Public Action is about 
responsibilities for moral and patrimonial losses against diffuse and collective interests. If the payments for the 
losses are monetary, such payment must be deposited in a fund that will be used to help to reconstitute the 
damaged goods (see Mattei de Oliveira Maciel, 2005). 
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What is a matter of specific rights for the Indigenous people is an issue of research and development 
profit for the companies. After almost six years of a convoluted process, in 2013, the Federal Justice 
Court in the State of Acre decided to order the researcher and his company Tawaya to share 15% of its 
profits with the Ashaninka and considered Natura and Chemyunion innocent of the charges (Facundes, 
2013). 
Case Study 3:  Immigrant Colonists  and Rubber Tappers in the RECA project  
In the late 1970s, landless immigrant family farmers, mostly from southern Brazil, arrived in Seringal, 
Santa Clara, an old rubber tapping area originally established in the 1950s in the Amazonian State of 
Rondônia. In 1982, the National Institute for Colonization and Agrarian Reform (INCRA) initiated an 
Agrarian Reform Settlement Project there to support the newly arrived farmers of European descent and 
the local rubber tappers. After dividing the land among the families, INCRA did not offer any support to 
the settlers. It simply pushed them to engage in slashing and burning the forest without planning. Many 
of the immigrants succumbed to malaria, and others began to return to their home states by the late 
1980s, after realizing that Amazonian lands tended to lose fertility when plowed and cultivated in the 
manner they had used in the South. Besides, the area was under a boundary dispute between the states of 
Rondônia and Acre, and neither state government was assisting the settlers.   
At the time, one of the settlers who was about to “sell my land even for the price of the tickets to go back” 
decided, instead, to join efforts with other remaining farmers to salvage their farms (T. Moreira, 2003,  
p. 30). He soon became one of the directors of the first farmers’ association, which was established in 
1989. In despair, the remaining southern family farmers approached local rubber tappers and discussed 
possibilities to improve their lives without harming the environment. Priest Luiz Ceppi from the Land 
Pastoral Commission (CPT) of Acre recollected what he witnessed during this initial encounter among 
different interest groups:  
The southerners considered themselves as smarter, stronger and hardworking. The common 
language was that all Acreanos [the locals, native of the now neighboring State of Acre, mainly 
rubber tappers] were lazy, who only knew to drink and go after women. The Acreanos thought 
the southerners were bossy. The “Paulistas” [people from the southern State of São Paulo] were 
those who deforested and moved away. Many rubber tappers hated the “Paulistas,” because they 
had to leave their own “colocações” [rubber tappers’ traditionally occupied lands] . . . For the 
Acreano, what is worthy is not the profit; what counts is time. Then, why to work hard? What is 
worthy is the life within time. The time is what dominates. The [local] people work in the 
harvest time, and after that, they just stop working . . . The Acreano does not like to work as an 
employee. The rubber tapper works five days. Saturday is the hunting day and Sunday is for 
leisure. This philosophy of life survival made the Amazon remaining almost untouched for 
thousand of years. The “Paulistas” domination arrived with the mentality of slashing [the 
forest]; they had to do, to touch. The Acreano in the forest has a strong sense of freedom and 
autonomy. There was this marriage [between the Paulistas and the Acreanos]. The RECA 
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system was born, in the extent that they united; it is not reforestation, but a way of respecting the 
environment and of taking from this culture what is enough to live. (Moreira, 2003, p. 22)15 
Participants of the RECA project realized that southerners had better organization and cooperation 
skills in meeting the market demand, whereas local rubber tappers had better knowledge about the forest 
and native fruit trees. Combining these abilities, they conceived an agro-forestry project in early 1990, 
which the federal government initially refused to support. Some 80 families organized themselves and 
obtained support from the local bishop, who then contacted donor agencies and collaborators. An 
agronomist from Centrale voor Bemiddeling bij Medefinanciering van Ontwikkelingsprogramma 
(CEBEMO), a funding agency of the Dutch Catholic Church, provided technical assistance to establish 
406 hectares of agro-forestry systems with native trees such as peach palm (Bactrisgasipaes Kunth), 
cupuaçu (Theobroma grandiflorum) (Wild. ex Spreng K. Schum), cocoa (Theobroma cacao), and 
Brazil-nuts (Bertholetia excelsa Bonpl).  
In the following years, the farmers managed to access governmental and non-governmental funds to 
expand the area and number of families. In this process, they incorporated external aid to expand their 
business capacity. In 2001 and 2002, they were engaged in agro-forestry to recover degraded pastures; as 
Mrs. Leonir calculated: “32 hectares of pastures provide R$16.000 from the sale of calves, that is, R$500 
per hectare/year. 5.5 hectares of average productivity agroforestry systems provide R$ 10.000 per year, 
or R$ 1.818 per hectare/year” (cited in T. Moreira, 2003, p.64). The immigrant farmers learned agro-
forestry principles from the native traditional communities and applied them to the restoration of 
pasturelands and to create better access to market. The RECA leader, Selvino Sordi, explained the 
rationale for emphasizing agro-forestry:  
. . . cupuaçu by itself provides up to R$3,000 per hectare, while the rice we plant gives no more 
than R$1,000. To get 100 bags, the rice must be very good. Cupuaçu as a single crop provides 7 
tons [of fruits] per hectare. Once, we made an economic census amongst ourselves. Those who 
entered the project in 1989 had an income of R$6,800. Those who entered in 1991, had 
between R$4,000 and R$4,500. Who had conventional cultivation [of rice, corn, beans] had no 
more than R$800. (Moreira, 2003, p.64) 
Commercialization of the agro-forestry began in 2001. As of 2008, this organization was divided into 11 
sub-groups, each working on 2,700 hectares of agro-forestry systems. Altogether they produce and sell 
annually more than 1,000 tons of fruits, 450 tons of diverse fruit pulps, 100 tons of dry and fermented 
seeds, and 40 tons of cupuaçu butter, in addition to tons of Brazil nuts, their oil, processed peach palm 
hearts, seedlings, and seeds. In their agro-forestry systems, they intercrop more than 20 species in 
addition to medicinal plants.  
In 2009, they inaugurated a Family Agricultural School,16 and progressively partnered with other 
organizations to commercialize and represent their products in several Brazilian capitals, including São 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 In the mid-1980s, when the government promoted settlement projects for agrarian reform purposes, the 
presence of rubber tappers and their traditional ways of life were completely ignored. The areas the rubber tappers 
used were divided into standard 100-hectare plots and allotted to each beneficiary. These plots were distributed 
among applicants from all over the country. This began to change in the late 1980s, due to social mobilization and 
conflicts. The 1988 National Constitution also stipulated to respect traditionally occupied lands.   
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Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. Educating their children and investing in fair trade, they hope to maintain their 
tradition as family farmers.  
RECA signed a Benefit Sharing Contract with Natura in late 2007 and maintained a strong partnership 
with the company, which includes support for certification processes and a significant contribution to 
the Family School. According to one of RECA’s advisors, who participated in a seminar promoted by 
babaçu breaker women on the topic, “we are good partners with Natura, because at RECA we knew 
exactly what we wanted from the very beginning” (personal communication).  In a 2012 workshop 
promoted by the Ministry of Environment, a young RECA leader affirmed: “Benefit sharing is important, 
but more important to us is to survive, to produce without depending on external support” (personal 
communication). According to RECA farmers, they have “nosso jeito de caminhar,” their own way to 
walk, which allows them to combine traditional and market forms to produce and commercialize, and to 
establish partnerships with researchers and entrepreneurs.  
Commoditization of  Traditional  Knowledge 
By contrasting the case study of traditional communities of babassu breaker women with those of the 
Indigenous Ashaninka people and the family farmers’ RECA Association, one may notice diversity in the 
expression of their identities, knowledge, and relations with the market. The Ashaninka identify 
themselves as Indigenous people on the basis of their common origin and ancestral ethnicity expressed 
in language, immaterial, and material culture. Interviewing Ashaninka leaders one learns that, by their 
own definition, Ashaninka is the person who owns Ashaninka’s knowledge of how to live on this earth, 
and this knowledge includes participation in the market under their own terms. According to the market 
logic, the Ashaninka would profit more from the partnership with the researcher who created Tawaya 
and installed a processing plant to extract murumuru, as compared to leaving the murumuru out of the 
market while the Ashaninka themselves did not have the capital for such investments. However, the 
Ashaninka were certain that they were the owners of the knowledge about murumuru, and demanded 
reparation from the researcher who took advantage of local cooperation against their will.   
The Quebradeiras identify themselves as traditional communities while acknowledging that the 
invention of mesocarp flour has Indigenous origins. However, they assume the ownership of the 
knowledge about how to extract and sell mesocarp flour collectively, as a means to prevent oppression 
by merchants and landlords and fight for political transformation—tradition here is more related to the 
historical search for freedom from patron than the mesocarp flour recipe. Participation in the market is 
regulated by local rules on when and how to gather babaçu fruits, and not necessarily by profit making.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Family Agricultural School is an alternative model of rural schooling based on the “Pedagogy of Alternating,” in 
which the students spend 15 days each month at school in a boarding scheme and another 15 days in his or her 
rural community researching or applying what they learned at school. This method began to take shape in 1935 
when family farmers in France struggled for a differentiated system of education to attend to their specific needs. 
This system was introduced to Brazil in the late 1960s. The promoters of this system believed that youths should 
not be forced to leave his or her community to receive education; learning about what they actually do is a 
privileged process; the community should be responsible for the education of their youths; and models of 
education are political in the sense that may aim at either maintenance or transformation of power distribution in 
society. 
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At RECA, only the rubber tappers recognize themselves as traditional communities, but they joined 
immigrant family farmers of European descent to form the RECA Association. Now, both are 
recognized as a local community, merging their commitments on a common project. Historically, the 
rubber tappers owned the traditional knowledge about the native species and their uses. However, to 
better participate in the market, this traditional community strategically shared this ownership with 
immigrants and now participate in negotiations with researchers and industries taking advantage of their 
knowledge.  
Despite having varied knowledge shaped by diverse heritage and tradition, all three cases share a type of 
knowledge production that emerged from historic antagonistic relations and contestation against 
dominant sectors of society and state governments. Only after years and even generations of struggle, 
they were recognized as deserving of public support. However, despite this similarity, we can learn from 
the case studies that the greater a group’s integration with and dependence on the market, the greater 
the possibilities to conciliate their views on knowledge ownership and benefit sharing with the 
perspectives of the researcher and industries. Distinct economic incentives and trajectories, as well as 
political understandings, influenced the way each group conducted these relationships regarding use of 
natural resources. Acselrad (2012) demonstrated that since mid-1990s, the Brazilian government, 
enterprises, and multilateral entities are engaged in efforts to neutralize the environmental struggles by 
local groups. Our study suggests that partnerships to transform extractive resources produced through 
traditional knowledge into commodities are a strategy of these efforts, sanctioned by new laws. 
Nonetheless, Acselrad (2012) affirmed that organizations rooted in their social contexts, practicing a 
“critical ecologism” have maintained their actions of resistance: 
The struggles for environmental justice, such as those characterized in the Brazilian case, have 
combined: the defense of rights for culturally specific environments—of traditional 
communities located in the frontiers of capitalist and market expansion; the defense of rights to 
an environmental protection against socio-territorial segregation and the environmental 
inequalities promoted by the market and sanctioned by the State; the defense for rights to fair 
access to environmental resources, against the concentration of fertile land, waters and soils in 
the hands of the strongest economic interests in the market. (p. 47) 
We ought to consider the plural composition of society and the specificities of those joining these 
struggles, highlighting the sui generis nature of traditional knowledge while emphasizing the risks 
brought about by a process of knowledge commoditization. Issues of knowledge ownership and the 
advantages of cooperation among entrepreneurs, researchers, and communities refer, above all, to 
questions about the rights of each party in a given state. Moreover, such rights are not conceived in an 
economic, political, and social vacuum. They are formulated in the realm of very tangible, historically 
constructed social and governance spaces. They are affected by the ways of governing adopted by 
authorities of the societies in respective states. 
We face environmental problems because of processes in which nature has become a commodity in the 
market (Derani, 2002; Edelman, 1976; E. Moreira, 2007; Ost, 1995). Then we face the question as to 
whether we can solve these environmental problems by creating mechanisms and adopting strategies 
that introduce traditional knowledge and communities within these market processes.   
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According to a quote attributed to Einstein: “We can't solve problems by using the same kind of thinking 
we used when we created them” (Harris, 1995, para. 28). Reflecting on our research experiences, we 
learned that the implementation of the Provisional Act 2186-16/2001 and the introduction of 
traditional knowledge within market-based mechanisms have given little or no control to traditional and 
local communities in the Amazon region. This is because, in their way of life, nature or knowledge about 
nature are not something to be merchandized. This does not mean that traditional communities do not 
obtain or derive marketable products from nature. They do sell them as merchandise in the market, and 
they want and deserve good prices for them. Moreover, they deserve access to conditions and resources 
to develop new technologies to improve their production as they wish.  
However, for some communities, nature and knowledge per se are not considered commodities, whose 
profits can be privately appropriated. Past studies have shown that access to traditional knowledge is 
protected against commoditization among peers by acts of “gift-giving” (Mauss, 1974), in culturally 
established collective systems. In relation to external researchers and entrepreneurs, it is necessary to 
consult with them to establish what kind of categories and instruments are to be protected as part of 
their collective rights. For this, there are traditional communities elaborating community protocols to 
establish their own terms of consultation. 
It is important to remember that the juridical categories “subject of right” and “contract” are master 
pillars of the private order in the modern juridical systems (Carbonnier, 1983; Edelman, 1976; Roppo, 
1988). These categories were created to secure free circulation of goods and capital in liberal capitalist 
economies. According to Derani (2002), while treating traditional communities as subjects of rights to 
sign contracts under the Provisional Act 2186-16/2001, the Brazilian government has incorporated 
traditional knowledge into the market.  
Empirical evidence shows that, as new subjects of rights, traditional people and communities became 
entitled to potentially dispose of things such as knowledge and genetic resources as the rightful owners 
(in the private sense of proprietors). Therefore, they may lose the “full claim, authority, power, 
dominion” (Webster, 1994, p. 1032) as a collectivity over a common resource. Benefit-sharing contracts 
signed in market-based ways of governing may just assure secure access and circulation of knowledge as 
merchandise for those who already control the economic field—the companies.  
To implement the CBD in the national juridical system, the State has employed the usual juridical 
categories of “subject of rights” and “contracts,” which are related to the private order. But the state has 
incorporated the newly recognized subjects—traditional people and communities, who do not always 
conceive what they own (lands and knowledge, for example) as private goods, but as commons. As a 
juridical category, the contract delineates the complex ordering of the private relations involving distinct 
subjects of rights, and its essence is to make an economic transaction possible in the market (Roppo, 
1988).  
Once a modality of contract—such as benefit sharing contracts—is considered legal in the national 
order, the complex historical context and the distinct traditions that gave origin to its juridical 
construction are disregarded; its connection to the contradictions of society is elapsed. In the hazy 
processes of benefit sharing between researchers, companies, and communities, the dominant focus on 
financial aspects in the private order prevails, and the assumption that all members of that nation have 
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equal “individual freedom” and “autonomy of will,” as recognized in the General Theory of Contract 
(Lobo, 1986), becomes questionable. Resources such as knowledge and biodiversity that were 
traditionally conceived as the commons are now treated as goods suitable for transactions between 
private subjects with “individual freedom,” regardless of the negative effects of these transactions on 
biodiversity and cultural and social cohesion (Araújo, 2002).  
Experiments Carried Out By Traditional  Communities  
Since 2008, the Babassu Breaker Women’s Movement has shifted its focus from the domain of formal 
rules and norms regulating access to traditional knowledge to the domain of lived rights, which have 
been built through daily practices of their ways of life. This repositioning put more emphasis on an 
intersection between the law and the policy. The bottom line is that struggling for rights is a matter of 
changing how power is organized and distributed in a society. To do this, they have invited other 
traditional communities to discuss their experiences—both similarities and differences—regarding the 
CBD implementation. Aware of the contradictions in a state in which market-based ways of governing 
predominate, they are also dealing with the practical issues about on-going processes in accessing 
traditional knowledge and benefit sharing. Despite the social and economic diversity among the 
participants of their social movement, the babassu breaker women and invited representatives from 
other traditional communities made preliminary recommendations in September 2011. Some of them 
are listed below: 
1. When negotiating with companies, a community needs a plan to maintain its own integrity: 
neither leaders nor collaborators should respond to the company individually, on behalf of 
the group, alleging greater efficiency. The dialogue must be kept in collective spaces.  
2. During the process of formalizing prior free and informed consent, community 
representatives should not sign without demonstrating a collective consent: a document 
registering the meeting where the whole group has consented should be attached.  
3. Traditional communities must demand their rights to access legitimate and qualified 
collaborators and advisors for deepening the discussions and supporting them in 
negotiations. These are new grounds of knowledge for all: communities, researchers, 
entrepreneurs, governmental, and non-governmental agents should engage in collective 
social learning.   
4. Disrespect against the rhythms and timing of the community is not acceptable—no matter 
how long it takes to find the right information and collaborators, and to reach collective 
decisions. The community should not accept imposition by the company to expedite the 
process. 
5. It is necessary to demand transparency and ethical conduct from all parties. Governmental 
and non-governmental agents may suggest favorable opinion towards the company, because 
they want to regularize their actions without prior informed consent. 
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6. The community needs to identify what kind of information or practice is non-negotiable. 
The transformation of ways of life happens every day, but communities must control it as 
much as they can. 
7. Communities should not sign agreements of exclusivity with any given company. 
8. Companies may seek to demand secrecy clauses in contracts or other instruments. It is their 
responsibility to keep their industrial secrets. Anything discussed with communities are up 
to the communities themselves to decide if and how to communicate. Communities should 
not accept restrictions on their freedom to share information about agreements and 
processes, including information about negotiated payments. 
9. Communities must be careful when speaking to the media about accords, not to 
overestimate the companies’ benefits and underestimate the community capacities. 
10. Companies may offer payments to individual members of traditional communities for the 
use of images and for speeches, without previous discussions at the community level. 
Communities should discuss this provision and decide whether or not to accept such use. 
11. Communities must be aware that sometimes the pressures exerted by companies are not 
perceptible or not perceived by all members. Companies’ agendas should not define 
communities’ agendas. 
12. Although relationships between a company and a community, and even with advisors and 
consultants, may appear harmonious, it is important to assure the community’s control in 
the selection of participants in decision-making meetings and other privacy rights. 
Other communities are working on community protocols as well.17 Reflecting on these concerns, we 
learned that, in market-based ways of governing, researchers and entrepreneurs will engage in 
relationships with traditional communities to the extent they achieve good effects in the market. 
However, in alternative ways of governance as sought by some Indigenous people and traditional 
communities, researchers and entrepreneurs should not take advantage of local cooperation for their 
own projects. As the scientific and entrepreneurial actors already enjoy greater advantages in 
mainstream society, they should instead be the ones to support traditional communities’ projects. In 
alternative ways of governance, such as those attempted in Ecuador and Bolivia, in which Nature itself is 
considered a subject of rights, Indigenous ways of life and cosmovision are recalled to drive society’s 
relation to nature aimed at “buen vivir” (Sumak Kawsay, in kechwa) or good living (Gudynas, 2009, 
2014). 
Final  Considerations 
Having ratified both the CBD and ILO 169, Brazil has taken formal steps toward complying with its 
obligation to assure Indigenous and traditional people and communities’ rights to their knowledge. 
However, a prevalent market-based way of governing its society has created an extreme power imbalance, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 For an example of community protocols, see Gomes (2015). 
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which prevent effective implementation. The use of categories founded in the private order of the 
modern juridical theory has not assured collective rights for the people and communities. Instead, the 
adoption of instruments such as subjects of rights and contracts may result in transforming knowledge 
into merchandise. 
As the three cases above have illustrated, Indigenous peoples and local communities may have diverse 
approaches toward the question of accessing traditional knowledge and benefit sharing, depending on 
how they want to be related to markets. Some local communities consider that having companies as 
partners can improve what they want from forests. Others wonder what forests want from them. Diocina 
Lopes, a babassu breaker woman, has taught to our research team: 
What I like the most in my life is to get into the forest. I sit there for a good while. It refreshes our 
mind and so we learn. It is the best teacher for our people . . . it is this university, you know, the 
universe. You look at these forests and think: What do they want from us?” (personal 
communication, 2011, interviewed by Pro-cultura research team in Ludovico village) 
 Despite their differences, all three cases have shown that local people are commonly aware of their 
rights to free, prior, and informed consent, and to participating in subsequent decision-making processes. 
They all perceive and claim the ownership of knowledge as a collective right. Governments must, 
therefore, incorporate this right into policies. A primary step in doing so is by establishing adequate 
public spaces and enabling conditions for debates in which the communities themselves define rules for 
interactions with researchers and entrepreneurs interested in the scientific achievements and economic 
benefits derived from their knowledge.  
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